FRENCH
L'EV1 fut la première voiture électrique de série produite par General Motors aux États-Unis et avant la Pontiac G6, fut le seul véhicule de l'histoire de cette société à porter la marque "General Motors". Cette voiture était uniquement disponible en location longue durée et non à la vente.
GM loua plus de 800 voitures EV1 sur les 1100 produites, les véhicules loués devant contractuellement être restitués à GM après le terme de la location de 3 ans. Elles étaient disponibles en Californie et en Arizona et pouvaient être louées et entretenues chez les concessionnaires Saturn.
Le but de l'EV1 était d'une part, de satisfaire les nouvelles lois californiennes sur les véhicules à zéro émission du début des années 1990. Ce programme ZEV (en anglais, Zero Emission Vehicle) spécifiait qu'en 1998, 2% de l'ensemble des véhicules mis en circulation devaient ne plus émettre aucun gaz polluant. GM dépensa plus d'un milliard de dollars pour développer et commercialiser l'EV1, bien qu'une grande partie de ce coût fut pris en charge par l'administration Clinton.
En 2001, GM annula le programme EV1. Malgré des listes d'attente de clients et un retour positif des locataires, GM déclara qu'il ne pourrait écouler assez de voitures pour rendre ce programme rentable et qu'une liste d'attente de 5000 personnes ne générait que 50 clients réellement disposés à louer, bien que chaque EV1 offerte à la location trouva preneur.Après un certain GM détruisit la majorité de ceux-ci et demeura silencieux par la suite. Le prix du véhicule utilisé pour le calcul des loyers variait de 33 995 $ à 43 995 $, ce qui représentait des loyers mensuels de 299 $ à 574 $. Un officiel de l'industrie automobile déclara que chaque EV1 coûtait à GM environ 80 000 $, incluant les coûts de recherche et de développement. Le prix de location des véhicules dépendait également des remises pratiquées par les États. À l'époque, le coût de l'électricité employée comme force motrice du véhicule revenait à environ 1/2 à 1/3 du coût en essence.
Un documentaire diffusé sur la chaîne publique PBS en juillet 2006 met en cause les lobbies pétroliers et l'administration Bush pour pousser GM à arrêter le programme de l'EV1. Le documentaire explique, entre autres, comment GM à soudainement décidé de détruire l'ensemble des EV1, malgré les propositions d'achat faite par les consommateurs qui sont allés jusqu'à proposer 1.9 millions de dollars et manifester pendant 5 jours devant les 78 modèles restants dans le stationnement de GM à Burbank[1]. Ce film documentaire, intitulé "Qui a tué la voiture électrique ?", peut être visualisé dans son intégralité sur Dailymotion, en cinq parties[2.
ENGLISH
History
[edit] Origins
In January 1990, GM chairman Roger Smith demonstrated the Impact, an electric concept car, at the 1990 Los Angeles Auto Show. The car had been developed by electric vehicle company AeroVironment, using design knowledge gained from GM's participation in the 1987 World Solar Challenge, a trans-Australia race for solar vehicles, with the Sunraycer, which went on to win the competition. Alan Cocconi of AC Propulsion designed and built the original drive controller electronics for the Impact, and the design was later refined by Hughes Electronics. On April 18, 1990,[10] Smith announced that the Impact would become a production vehicle.[11]
Impressed by the viability of the Impact, and motivated by GM's promise to produce the Impact, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) moved on a large environmental initiative, ruled that each of the U.S.'s seven largest carmakers—the largest of which was GM—would be required to make 2% of its fleet emission-free by 1998, 5% by 2001, and 10% by 2003, in accordance with consumer demand, in order to continue to sell cars in California.[11] The mandate was instated to combat California's poor air quality, which at the time was worse than the other 49 states combined.[12] Other members of what was then the American Automobile Manufacturers Association, along with Toyota, Nissan[13] and Honda, each also developed a prototype zero-emissions vehicle in response to the new mandate.
In 1994, GM debuted 50 hand-built Impacts to use in a consumer study. The cars would be lent to drivers for periods of one to two weeks, under the agreement that their experiences would be logged; the program was known as PrEView, and organized by GM's Sean McNamara.[11] Volunteers had to own a garage where a high-current charging unit could be installed by an electric company.[14] McNamara expected at most eighty volunteers in the Los Angeles area, but was forced to close the phone lines after 10,000 people called in.[12] In metropolitan New York, 14,000 callers responded before the lines were closed.[14][15] Driver response to the cars was favorable, as were reviews by car magazines. According to Motor Trend, "The Impact is precisely one of those occasions where GM proves beyond any doubt that it knows how to build fantastic automobiles. This is the world's only electric vehicle that drives like a real car." That year, a modified Impact set a land speed record for production electric vehicles of 183 mph (295 km/h).
Automobile called the car's ride and handling "amazing," praising its "smooth delivery of power". The Impact was a hit with consumers; but according to some, GM was less than pleased with the prospect of a successful electric car. According to Matthew L. Wald, in a front-page story in The New York Times:
“
General Motors is preparing to put its electric vehicle act on the road, and planning for a flop.
With pride and pessimism, the company, the furthest along of the Big Three in designing a mass-market electric car, says that in the face of a California law that requires that 2 percent of new cars be "zero emission" vehicles beginning in 1997, it has done its best but that the vehicle has come up short.... Now it hopes that lawmakers and regulators will agree with it and postpone or scrap the deadline.[14]
”
By Wald's claims, GM was preparing for and simultaneously fighting against the CARB regulations; the company had done its best, but found that the mass-market electric car was not currently feasible. According to Dennis Minano, then-GM Vice President for Energy and Environment, "Is it what our customer wants?"[14] GM was not alone in its denunciation of electric vehicles as a viable alternative to the gasoline car; according to Robert J. Eaton, then-chairman of Chrysler, "The question is whether the market is ready for the product... if the law is there, we'll meet it... at this point of time, nobody can forecast that we can make [an electric car]."[14] In the words of Thomas C. Jorling, then Commissioner of Environmental Conservation for New York State, which had adopted the California emission program, consumers had demonstrated tremendous interest in electric cars, but automakers did not want to render obsolete their multi-billion dollar investments in internal combustion engine technology.[14] After PrEView ended, GM destroyed all 50 of the cars.[11]
[edit] Release of Gen I and initial reaction
GM continued work on its electric car program. By 1996, the Impact concept had evolved into the GM EV1; it was to be the first GM car in history to wear a "General Motors" nameplate, instead of one of GM's marques.[11] The first-generation, or "Gen I" car, which would be powered by lead-acid batteries, had a stated range of 70 to 100 miles; 660 examples in dark green, red, and silver were produced.[11][16] On December 5, 1996, GM began delivering the EV1s to its selection of carefully-screened lessees; in similar fashion to the Impact's PrEView program, only residents of Southern California and Arizona could participate in the leasing program, and there was no option to purchase the cars.[17] A contractual clause specifically disallowed re-purchase of the vehicle at the conclusion of the leasing period.[citation needed] Domestic television networks, as well as crews from the BBC, Japan's NHK were on hand for the launch.[17] Actors Ed Begley Jr. and Alexandra Paul were among the first to sign their GMAC leases.[17] Other lessees included a Los Angeles city councilman, a Skylab solar-panel engineer, and Jordan Harris, the president of Sony Music.[17] The car's release was accompanied by an $8 million promotional campaign, which included prime-time TV advertising, billboards, a web site, and an appearance at the premiere of the Sylvester Stallone film Daylight.[17] By the time the release event wrapped up, 40 EV1s had been leased through 24 Saturn dealers; GM estimated that 100 EV1s would be leased by the end of the year,[17] and went on to lease 300 more in 1997.[18] The car's limited launch sparked concern that GM had made a deal with CARB to delay the implementation of the first phase of the ZEV program, which had been scheduled to go into effect in 1998.[19]
Some consumer organizations, allegedly funded by oil companies, opposed the use of taxpayer money to build an electric vehicle charging infrastructure
Although the car could not be purchased outright, its MSRP was quoted at $34,000.[17] Joe Kennedy, vice president of marketing for Saturn, accepted concerns regarding the vehicle's cost, the outdated lead-acid battery technology, and the EV1's limited range, and said "Let us not forget that technology starts small and grows slowly before technology improves and costs go down."[17] Concerns were also voiced by anti-taxation groups, who alleged that the exemptions and tax credits that EV1 lessees received constituted government-subsidized motoring for affluent professionals.[17] Some of these groups, such as consumer organization Californians Against Utility Company Abuse which mounted opposition to the use of taxpayer dollars to build public EV charging stations, were accused of receiving their funding from and being mouthpieces for the oil industry.[20]
In 1999, the brand manager for the EV1 program, Ken Stewart, described the response of the car's drivers as "wonderfully-manical loyalty."[21] Points in the car's favor included its styling, ride, handling, and performance. The lessees had integrated the EV1 into their lifestyle, making their electric car less a novelty item and more a primary source of transportation.[21] Tom Hanks praised the car on late-night talk shows, saying "Believe it or not, that sucker goes!"[20]
Despite the enthusiasm of the first group of drivers, GM demonstrated ambivalence towards promoting the electric car after its initial release. One of its initial TV spots was nominated for an Emmy award; but later advertising was less visible, limited to direct mail and print and TV ads in niche channels.[18] Officially, GM remained committed to the electric vehicle, but drivers were concerned that low public interest would result in the program being scrapped.[18] One driver, Marvin Rush, a cinematographer for the TV series Star Trek: Voyager, was so concerned with GM's weak efforts that he spent $20,000 of his own funds to produce and air four unofficial radio commercials for the car.[18] While the automaker was initially appalled, it later changed its position, announcing that it would make the spots official and reimburse Rush. The company spent $10 million on EV1 advertising in 1997, and promised to increase that amount by $5 million the following year.[18] According to then-EV1 program brand manager Frank Periera, the EV1 was not suited to a high-profile advertising campaign because it only appealed to a small fraction of the car-buying public, who were unfazed at the prospect of a relatively expensive (lease payments were $399 per month), limited-range two-seater.[18]
[edit] Second generation: 1999-2003
The EV1 was equipped with a more-advanced NiMH battery pack for the 1999 model year (Toyota Prius battery pictured)
For the 1999 model year, GM released a Gen II version of the EV1. Major improvements included lower production costs, quieter operation, extensive weight reduction, and the advent of a nickel-metal hydride (NiMH) battery.[11] The Gen II models were initially released with a 60 amp-hour (18.7 kilowatt-hour) Panasonic lead-acid battery pack, a slight improvement over the Gen I power source using the same 312 V voltage; later models featured an Ovonics NiMH battery rated at 77 Ah (26.4 kWh) with 343 volts. Cars with the lead-acid pack had a range of 80 to 100 miles, while the NiMH cars could travel between 100 and 140 miles between charges. For the second-generation EV1, the leasing program was expanded to the cities of San Diego, Sacramento, and Atlanta; monthly payments ranged from $349 to $574.[11] 457 Gen II EV1s were produced by General Motors and leased to customers in the eight months following December 1999.[22] According to some sources, hundreds of drivers wanted to but could not become EV1 lessees.[11]
On March 2, 2000, GM issued a recall for 450 Gen I EV1s. The automaker had determined that a faulty charge port cable could eventually build up enough heat to catch on fire. Sixteen "thermal incidents" and at least one fire occurred as a result of the defect, destroying a car owned by Ron Brauer and Ruth Bygness as it was charging.[23] The recall did not affect second-generation EV1s.[24]
Over the next two years, approximately 200 Gen I EV1s were refitted with NiMH batteries and re-issued to their original lessees on revised two-year leases, including a new limited-mileage clause.[25] Delays were involved due to design complications resulting from the NiMH pack retrofit.[26] As a result, GM offered Gen I drivers the opportunity to terminate their lease at no charge,[27][28] or the chance to transfer the lease to one of the remaining 150 second-generation EV1s — ahead of those already on the waiting list for Gen II models.[29]
[edit] Program cancellation
Despite continued interest in the EV1, and filled waiting lists, GM pressed ahead with its battle against CARB regulations, going as far as to sue CARB in federal court.[20] At the 2000 hearings, GM declared that consumers were not showing sufficient interest in the EV1 to meet CARB mandates.[11] The American automaker, along with Toyota, cited a study they had commissioned, which showed that customers would only choose an electric car over a gasoline car if it cost a full $28,000 less than a comparable gasoline car. Dr. Kenneth E. Train of UC Berkeley, who conducted the study, stated that given a typical retail price of $21,000 for a RAV4 SUV, "Toyota would have to give the average consumer a free RAV4-EV plus a check for approximately $7,000."[30] An independent study commissioned by the California Electric Transportation Coalition (CalETC) and conducted by the Green Car Institute and the Dohring Company automotive market research firm found very different results. The study "used the same research methodologies employed by the auto industry to identify markets for its gasoline vehicles".[31] It found the annual consumer market for EVs to be 12-18% of the new light-duty vehicle market in California, amounting to annual sales of between 151,200 and 226,800 electric vehicles,[32] approximately ten times the quantity specified by CARB's mandate.[31] The results of the Toyota-GM study were also questionable in light of the success of Toyota's electric RAV4-EV, which retailed at $30,000 yet had a waiting list of its own.[11] At the hearings, the automakers also presented the hydrogen vehicle as a higher alternative to the gasoline car, bolstered by a recent federal earmark for hydrogen research. Many, including members of the CARB hearing committee, were concerned that this was a bait-and-switch on the automakers' part, in order to make CARB eliminate the EV mandate, and that hydrogen was not as viable as it was made to seem.[20]
In 2001, Judge Robert E. Coyle of the US District Court for the Eastern District of California issued a preliminary injunction on June 11 against the CARB, preventing the implementation of 2001 amendments to the state's ZEV mandate. The original regulation allowed the carmakers to substitute a variety of advanced-technology, partial-zero emission vehicles in place of battery EVs. This effectively reduced the number of battery electrics sold to as few of 2% of the original 10% dictated by the mandate. The car companies successfully argued that CARB's method of determining whether or not a vehicle qualified as an Advanced Technology Partial ZEV (AT PZEV), it used the vehicle's fuel economy as one of the standards, in addition to reduced emissions. The court viewed this provision as unconstitutional. This left CARB unable to enforce its 2001 amendments through 2004, and chose to delay the ZEV stipulations.[33]
The GM training center in Burbank, California, served as a storage location for many EV1s prior to being crushed, and saw protests and vigils by EV1 drivers and fans
By 2002, 1,117 EV1s had been produced, though production had ended in 1999, when GM shut down the EV1 assembly line.[citation needed] On February 7, 2002, GM Advanced Technology Vehicles brand manager Ken Stewart notified lessees that GM would be removing the cars from the road, contradicting an earlier statement that GM would in fact not be "taking cars off the road from customers."[34] Drivers feared that their working cars would be destroyed after repossession, given historic GM actions such as the destruction of the Impact prototypes and the company's alleged role in the Great American streetcar scandal.
In late 2003, General Motors, then led by CEO Rick Wagoner, officially canceled the EV1 program.[9][35] GM stated that it could not sell enough of the cars to make the EV1 profitable.[36] In addition, the cost of maintaining a parts supply and service infrastructure for the 15-year minimum required by the state of California meant that existing leases would not be renewed, and all the cars would have to be returned to GM's possession. At least 58 EV1 drivers sent letters and deposit checks to GM, requesting lease extensions at no risk or cost to the automaker.[11] The drivers reportedly agreed to be responsible for the maintenance and repair costs of the EV1, and would allow GM the right to terminate the lease if expensive repairs were needed. On June 28, GM famously refused the offer and returned the checks, which totaled $22,000;[11] By contrast, Honda, which had taken similar actions with its EV+ program, agreed to extend its customer's leases.[11] In November 2003, GM began reclaiming the cars; several were donated to museums and educational institutions (e.g. Mott Community College in Flint, Michigan[37]), albeit with deactivated powertrains meant to keep the cars from ever running again, but the majority were sent to car crushers to be destroyed, allegedly with government permission to do so.[38]
[edit] Reaction
In the aftermath of the program, reactions to the cancellation of the EV1 continued to be mixed. In GM's view, the EV1 was not a failure, but the program was doomed when the expected breakthroughs in battery technology did not take place within the anticipated timeline,[39] citing the lack of availability of the NiMH-technology battery packs, developed by Energy Conversion Devices of Michigan, until late in the production cycle. The batteries improved the EV1's range, but not as dramatically as expected, and came with their own set of problems; a less-efficient charging algorithm had to be used (lengthening charge times), and the batteries heated up more quickly than the lead-acid packs (requiring use of the air conditioner to cool them down, wasting power).[40] The automaker also cited the elimination of the CARB zero-emissions mandate that led to the car's creation as a factor in the program's cancellation, though the company was widely accused of lobbying against the mandate in an act of deliberate self-sabotage. The media perspective was far less favorable; in 2006, the Wall Street Journal's Detroit Bureau Chief Joe White said, "The EV1 was a failure, as were other electric vehicles launched in the 1990s to placate California clean-air regulators."[41] This opinion as echoed by Time magazine, who in 2008 placed the EV1 on their list of "The 50 Worst Cars of All Time".[42]
In light of falling car sales later in the decade, as the world oil and financial crises began to take hold, opinions of the EV1 program began to change. In 2006, former GM Chairman and CEO Rick Wagoner stated that his worst decision during his tenure at GM was "axing the EV1 electric-car program and not putting the right resources into hybrids. It didn’t affect profitability, but it did affect image."[43] Wagoner repeated this assertion during an NPR interview after the December 2008 Senate hearings on the U.S. auto industry bailout request.[44] In the March 13, 2007 issue of Newsweek, "GM R&D chief Larry Burns . . . now wishes GM hadn't killed the plug-in hybrid EV1 prototype his engineers had on the road a decade ago: 'If we could turn back the hands of time,' says Burns, 'we could have had the Chevy Volt 10 years earlier,'"[45] referring to the forthcoming plug-in hybrid car which was hailed as the spiritual and technological successor to the EV1.
[edit] Resurrection
Some of the deactivated EV1s given to universities and engineering schools were reactivated, and driven on public roads. The institutions came under fire from General Motors for violating the agreements of the donation, which indicated that the cars not be "titled, licensed, nor driven on public highways" and could only be restored and showcased.[46][47] GM has potential legal obligations under laws that require automakers to maintain parts and service infrastructure for consumer vehicles for a period of no less than 15 years.
[edit] Technology and design
The engine bay of the EV1
The decades before the release of the Impact and the EV1 had seen little in the way of development on the electric car front. The Henney Kilowatt, which ended production in 1961, was the last time a feasible production electric car of any sort had been released; GM's own Electrovair and Electrovette of 1966 and 1976, respectively, never reached production, amounting to little more than conceptual electric conversion kits for the automaker's popular gasoline models. Technical and production costs difficulties were blamed.
In contrast to these cars, the EV1 was designed from the ground up to be an electric vehicle. It was not a conversion of an existing vehicle, nor did it share a drivetrain with another GM model, which contributed to its high development and production costs. The EV1 program was initially administered by a GM engineer named Kenneth Baker, who had been the lead on the Electrovette program in the 1970s.
[edit] Configuration
The EV1 was not only used to showcase the electric powertrain, but also premiered a number of features and technologies that would later find their way onto more common GM models and other manufacturers' cars. The EV1 was among the first production vehicles to utilize aluminum in the construction of the frame. The car's body panels were made of plastic rather than metal, making the car lightweight and dent resistant. Anti-lock brakes, which had just appeared on the production car scene, and a traction control system were among the EV1's advanced driveability technologies. Comfort improvements included a keyless entry and ignition system, a special one-way thermal glass for better heat rejection on sunny days, an automated tire pressure loss warning system, electric power steering, and a time-programmable HVAC system.
To boost efficiency, the EV1 possessed a very low drag coefficient (Cd) and reference area (CdA) of 0.19 and 0.36 m² (3.95 ft²), respectively.[48] Super-light magnesium alloy wheels and seats provided strength despite their low weight, and self-sealing, low-rolling resistance tires developed by Michelin rounded out the EV1's exceptional efficiency characteristics.
The EV1 featured an aluminum frame, dent-resistant plastic body panels, and was sculpted to a drag coefficient of just Cd 0.19
At 169.7 inches (4,310 mm) in length, and 69.5 inches (1,765 mm) in width, the EV1 was a subcompact car, with a 2-door coupé body style.
[edit] Drivetrain
The car's 3-phase AC induction electric motor produced 137 brake horsepower (102 kW) at 7000 rpm. Like all electrically-powered cars, and unlike a car powered by an ICE, the EV1 could deliver its full torque capacity throughout its power band, producing 110 pound-feet (149 newton-meters) of torque anywhere between 0 and 7000 rpm, allowing the omission of a manual or automatic gearbox. Power was delivered to the front wheels through a single-speed reduction integrated transmission.
[edit] Battery
The Gen I EV1 models, released in 1996, used lead-acid batteries, and weighed in at 3,086 pounds (1,400 kg). The first batch of batteries were provided by GM's Delphi branch; these were rated at a mere 53 amp-hours at 312 volts, and provided the initially mediocre range of 55 to 75 miles (90 to 120 km) per charge. Gen II cars, released in 1999, used a new batch of lead-acid batteries provided by Panasonic; some Gen I cars were retrofitted with this battery pack. The Japanese batteries were rated at 60 amp-hours (18.7 kWh) at 312 volts, and increased the EV1's range to 75 to 100 miles (120 to 160 km). Soon after the rollout of the second generation cars, the originally intended nickel metal hydride (NiMH) "Ovonic" battery pack, which reduced the car's curb weight to 2,908 pounds (1,319 kg) entered production; this pack was also retrofitted to earlier cars. The NiMH batteries, rated at 77 amp-hours (26.4 kWh) at 343 volts, gave the cars a range of 75 to 150 miles (120 to 240 km) per charge, more than twice what the original Gen I cars could muster.
It took the NiMH-equipped cars as much as eight hours for the cars to charge to full capacity (though an 80% charge could be achieved in between one and three hours). The Panasonic battery pack consisted of twenty-six 12 volt, 60 amp-hour lead-acid batteries holding 67.4 megajoules (18.7 kWh) of energy. The NiMH packs contained twenty-six 13.2 volt, 77 Ah nickel-metal hydride batteries which held 95.1 megajoules (26.4 kWh) of energy.
[edit] Driving experience
The EV1's interior
The experience of driving an EV1 was unlike a conventional gasoline or diesel vehicle. The EV1's drag coefficient of 0.19 was the lowest of any production automobile in history,[48] while typical production cars have Cd's in the 0.3 to 0.4 range. The EV1's clean shape meant it produced less wind noise at highway speeds, providing a more comfortable driving experience for its occupants. At lower speeds, and when stationary, the car produced little to no noise at all, save for a slight whine from the single-speed gear reduction unit. The car's smooth shape, waterfall tail and rear fender skirts gave it a distinctive appearance, reminiscent of an updated, 2-door Citroën DS. The EV1 had no analog dials, and all instrumentation readouts were displayed in a single thin curved strip mounted high on the dashboard, just underneath the windshield.
Thanks to the on-demand torque output of the electric motor, the EV1 could accelerate from 0–50 mph (0–80 km/h) in 6.3 seconds, and from 0–60 mph (0–97 km/h) in eight seconds.[49] The car's top speed was electronically limited to 80 mph (130 km/h). At the time of release, the lead-acid battery-equipped EV1 was the only electric car produced which met all of the United States Department of Energy's EV America performance goals.[50]
The home charger provided by GM, which was required for "fast recharging" of the car, measured roughly 1.5 by 2 by 5 feet (0.5 by 0.6 by 1.5 m), and featured integrated heatsinks and a resemblance to a gasoline pump. The charger refueled the car using induction, accomplished by inserting a Magne Charge paddle into the slot between the EV1's headlights. The wireless charging technology meant that no direct connection was made, and charging the car while it was raining did not pose any risks, though there were isolated incidents involving fires starting at the charge port. GM also offered a 120 V AC convenience charger that could be used with any standard North America power socket to slow-charge the battery pack. The convenience charger was not available for EV1s equipped with the NiMH battery packs.
[edit] Analysis of success vs. failure
The EV1 is seen as both a technological milestone and a business failure
The view of the EV1 as failure is a controversial one in itself. When viewed as an attempt to produce a viable EV product, it was a success, while certainly from GM's perspective not a commercial success as the high profit margins seen with internal combustion engine vehicles remained elusive. If one considers the vehicle as a technological showpiece—a production electric car that actually could replace a gasoline powered vehicle—the program's outcome is less clear. The EV1 was produced for the consumer market, and many lessees found driving an EV1 to be a favorable experience. On that basis, EV1 might qualify as the most successful electric car ever built.
Some analysts have suggested that it is inappropriate to compare the EV1 with existing gasoline powered commuter cars as the EV1 was, in effect, a completely new product category that had no equivalent vehicles to be judged against.
[edit] Costs
GM based the lease payments for the EV1 on an initial vehicle price of US$33,995.[5] Lease payments ranged from around $299 to $574 per month, depending on the availability of state rebates.[citation needed] Since GM did not offer consumers the option to purchase at the end of the lease, the car's residual value was never established, making it impossible to determine the actual full purchase price or replacement value. One industry official said that each EV1 cost the company about US$80,000, including research, development and other associated costs;[51] other estimates placed the vehicle's actual cost as high as $100,000.[5] GM stated the cost of the EV1 program at slightly less than $500 million before marketing and sales costs, and over $1 billion in total; a portion of this cost was defrayed by the Clinton Administration's $1.25 billion Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV) program.[52][53][54] In addition, all manufacturers seeking to produce electric cars for market consumption also benefited from matching government funds committed to the United States Advanced Battery Consortium.
[edit] Related development
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EV1 shown plugged into charging station
General Motors revealed several prototype variants of the EV1 drivetrain at the 1998 Detroit Auto Show. The models included diesel/electric parallel hybrid, gas turbine/electric series hybrid, fuel cell/electric version and compressed natural gas low emission internal combustion engine version.[55] In addition, during this period, GM reorganized their electronics divisions (amongst them Hughes Electronics and Delco Divisions) into Delco Propulsion Systems in order to attempt to commercialize this technology in niche markets. Several non-affiliated companies purchased inverter and drivetrain systems from DPS for vehicle/fleet conversion purposes.
The new platform was a four-passenger variant of the EV1, lengthened by 19". This design was based on an internal (GM) program for a more "marketable" EV begun during the proof of concept phase of the EV1's development. During the original EV1 R&D period, focus groups indicated one of the major market limiting factors of the original EV1 was its two seater configuration. GM investigated the possibility of making the EV1 a four seater, but ultimately determined that the increased length and weight of the four seater would reduce vehicle's already limited range to 40–50 miles - placing the first ground up electric car's performance squarely in the pack of aftermarket gas vehicle conversions. Understandably, the company elected to produce the lighter two seater design.
For hybrid and electric vehicles, the battery pack was upgraded to 44 NiMH cells, arranged in "I" formation down the centerline, which could fully recharge in just 2 hours using onboard 220 V induction charger; additional power units were installed in the trunk, thus complementing the 3rd generation 137 hp AC Induction electric motor installed in the hood. Hybrid modifications retained the capability of all-electric ZEV propulsion for up to 40 miles (64.4 km).
[edit] EV1 CNG
The compressed natural gas (CNG) variant was the only non-electric vehicle in the line-up, even though it employed the same up-stretched platform. It used a modified Suzuki 1.0-liter turbocharged 3-cylinder all-aluminum OHC engine installed under the hood. Due to the high octane rating of the CNG (allowing for a greater compression ratio), this small engine was able to deliver 72 hp at 5500 rpm.
The batteries were replaced with two CNG tanks capable of maximum operating pressure of 3000 psi. The tanks could be refueled from a single nozzle in only 4 minutes. In-tank solenoids shut off the fuel during refueling and engine idle, and a pressure relief device safeguarded against excessive temperature and pressure. With the help of a continuously variable transmission, the car accelerated 0 to 60 mph (96.6 km/h) in 11 seconds. The maximum range was 350 to 400 miles, and fuel economy was 60 mpg (in gasoline equivalent) .
[edit] EV1 series hybrid
EV1 series hybrid prototype at EVS-16 in Beijing, 1999
The series hybrid prototype[56] had a gas turbine engine APU placed in the trunk. A single-stage, single-shaft, recuperated gas turbine unit with a high-speed permanent-magnet AC generator was provided by Williams International; it weighed 220 lb (99.8 kg), measured 20 inches (50.8 cm) in diameter by 22 inches (55.9 cm) long and was running between 100,000 and 140,000 rpm. The turbine could run on a number of high-octane[citation needed] alternative fuels, from octane-boosted gasoline to compressed natural gas. The APU started automatically when the battery charge dropped below 40% and delivered 40 kW of electrical power, enough to achieve speeds up to 80 mph (128.8 km/h) and to return the car's 44 NiMH cells to a 50% charge level.
A fuel tank capacity of 6.5 US gal (24.6 L; 5.4 imp gal) and fuel economy of 60 mpg-US (3.9 L/100 km; 72 mpg-imp) to 100 mpg-US (2.4 L/100 km; 120 mpg-imp) in hybrid mode, depending on the driving conditions, allowed for a highway range of more than 390 miles (627.6 km). The car accelerated to 0-60 mph (96.6 km/h) in 9 seconds.
There was also a research program[57] that powered the series hybrid Gen2 version from Stirling engine based generator. The program demonstrated the technical feasibility of such drivetrain, but concluded that commercial viability was out of reach at that time.
[edit] EV1 parallel hybrid
The parallel hybrid variant featured a de-stroked 1.3 L turbocharged DTI diesel engine (Isuzu Circle L), delivering 75 hp (56 kW), installed in the trunk along with an additional 6.5 hp (4.8 kW) DC motor/generator; the two motors drove the rear wheels through an electronically controlled transaxle. When combined with the AC induction motor which powered the front wheels, all three power units delivered a total output of 219 hp (163 kW), accelerating the car to 0-60 mph (96.6 km/h) in 7 seconds. A single tank of diesel fuel could keep the car running for 550 miles (890 km) with a fuel economy of 80 mpg-US (2.9 L/100 km; 96 mpg-imp).[citation needed]
A similar technology is used in the 2005 Opel Astra Diesel Hybrid concept.
[edit] EV1 fuel cell
This variant extended all-electric propulsion capabilities with a methanol-powered fuel cell system (developed by Daimler-Benz/Ballard for the Mercedes-Benz NECAR), again installed in the trunk. The system consisted of a fuel processor, an expander/compressor and the fuel cell stack. The highway range was about 300 miles (480 km), with a fuel economy of 80 mpg-US (2.9 L/100 km; 96 mpg-imp) (in a gasoline equivalent). The car accelerated to 0-60 mph (96.6 km/h) in 9 seconds.
[edit] The EV1 in the media
An EV1 at a promotional event for the film
On November 14, 2006, a documentary film debuted entitled Who Killed the Electric Car?. The subject of the film is the demise of the EV1. Much of the film accounts for GM's efforts to demonstrate to California that there was no demand for their product and then to reclaim every last EV1 and dispose of them. A few vehicles were disabled and given to museums and universities, but almost all were found to have been crushed, or shredded using a special machine, as seen in the documentary.[58] GM responded to the film's claims, laying out several reasons why the EV1 was not commercially viable at the time. One theory discussed in the documentary is that the EV1 program was eliminated because it threatened the oil industry.
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